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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

FOREIGN MERCENARY TROOPS.—At page 369, that is to say, in the 12th Number of this present volume, I closed the discussion of this subject, as far as related to the legality of employing these mercenaries; and, I then signified my intention of discussing the expediency of doing it; which intention I am now about to fulfil. —We are not, upon this occasion, speaking of the *Foreign Corps* so much as of the *foreign Officers set to command our native troops*. And, what has been said by any one to shew the expediency of this? What has been said, or what can be said, to shew the expediency of employing Germans to command English regiments or English counties? Is there such a scarcity of native Officers in England? No; for we have, as I stated before, about 4,000 Officers upon half-pay, great numbers of whom are begging to be employed. Are not these as worthy of employment as the Germans? Are they not as likely to shew courage and fidelity in the service of their country?—One would think, that we were in great want of General Officers, at any rate, when we see the Germans put into the command of districts of our country; for, I repeat, that, in the last Army List, published by authority, Baron Linsingen is still stated to be the second in command in the five counties, composing the Eastern District of England. One would suppose, seeing this, that Generals, at any rate, were extremely scarce amongst us; that we had not a sufficiency of military officers of high rank; and that we were glad to catch at this German Baron to afford us his skill in taking care of five of our counties.—Yet, we should fall into a great error here; for, though this country abounds in many things; though it does greatly abound in tin, copper, and coals, it certainly abounds more in Generals, an article of which it has a greater abundance even than of sinecure placemen. We have, according to the Army List, published by authority, 2 Field Marshals, 82 Generals, 178 Lieutenant Generals, 300 Major Generals, making together 562 General Officers, besides the Brigadier Generals, which are, probably,

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equal in number to all the rest put together. However, leaving the Brigadiers out, here we have 562 Generals! More, I'll engage, than Buonaparté has. He talk of his army, indeed! What is his army; what is his pitiful army to one which has 562 permanent General Officers? Supposing our army to consist of 300,000 fighting men (including the Embodied Militia), this gives us a General Officer to every 533 men. What do you think of that, little Corsican? A General Officer to every 533 men! A permanent General Officer to every half of a battalion! Besides Brigadier Generals, if we were to include whom, we should, I dare say, have a General Officer to every 2 or 300 men. And, yet the French have the impudence and the folly to say, that we are not a military people; that we are unable to meet them in the field. Empty fellows! Where will they look, in their army, for 562 General Officers?—But, if we are thus strong in military rank; if we have a body of Generals, making, in point of numbers, half a battalion; if we are so rich in military skill as to be able to send forth a General to every 2 or 300 men; with almost every escort or picquet; if such be our state, we, surely, do not stand in need of foreign Generals to command our counties here, at home, in the very heart of England. Surely, out of the 562 Generals whom we have of our own, one might have been found worthy of being employed in the place of Baron Linsingen. Surely one out of this long number might have been found as worthy as he to inspect and review English regiments of Militia with English gentlemen (gentle, indeed!) at their head. Surely, it was not necessary to employ a German in this capacity. Surely the Eastern counties of England might have found in our long list of native Generals some one able to fill the place that he now fills.—And, as to officers of inferior rank; as to those who are set over regiments and battalions and companies, we have little short of 20,000 of them! We have a commissioned Officer, I believe, to about every seven effective private men. In short, we are rich, beyond all comparison in commissioned officers. The French

talk of their great army, indeed: why, we have an army, and a good stout army too, of Commissioned Officers. I have, with as much care as I have been able to bestow upon it, counted all the names in the Army List, and I make them amount to upwards of 25,000. Twenty-five thousand gentlemen in arms, Buonaparté, think of that!

—But, then, is not this abundance of officers; is not this wealth in military commanders a pretty good argument against the employing of foreigners to command our regiments, battalions and companies? We have but about 200 battalions, including Militia, or, say 250, of all sorts; so that, we have, at this rate not less than 100 Commissioned Officers to each battalion! Good heavens! and must we import officers? Have we not enough of native growth? Must we send to Germany for officers to command our men? Cannot we find out, amongst all these thousands of native officers, enough to intrust with the command of their countrymen? If so, what a pretty spectacle do we exhibit to Buonaparté?—I hold, then, that we have officers enough of our own; quite plenty. I hold, that we have more commissioned officers, and especially more General Officers; more officers of high rank; and, of course, more officers of great skill, than Buonaparté has; and, this being the case, I should be glad if any one would point out to me a sufficient reason for the employing of foreigners as commissioned officers.—It was said by Lord Palmerston, that we ought to look at Buonaparté and see what he did in this way. “Did not he force the Spaniards into Denmark, and the Italians and Germans into Spain? Did he not make the countries he conquered the chief instruments of further conquests? To follow his example, or, indeed, to act with prudence in the present state of Europe, we, too, should not refuse the aid of foreigners, especially of those who have a common cause with us.”—This does not at all apply to what was objected to by Lord Folkestone; for, it was of employing *foreign officers to command Englishmen*, and not the employing of foreign soldiers to fight the French that he had been complaining. However, let us see a little what is here said about following the example of Buonaparté; and we shall find, I believe, that his example is not followed by us.—We are told, that he forced the Spaniards into Denmark, and that he has forced the Italians and Germans into Spain. Do we force these foreigners,

then? No. Then we do not, in this regard, follow Buonaparté's example. But, reader, what an idea is this! What a ridiculous idea is this; that Napoleon forced, that he was able to *force*, a Spanish army to go to Denmark; that is to say, to march out of Spain; to march all across Europe, and that, too, under the command of that distinguished patriot, the Marquis de la Romana! And then to force the people in Germany and Italy to march across Europe in another direction to go into Spain to fight, and to conquer, in the Provinces of Spain! The feats of the Prince of the powers of the air does not come up to the feats of this man!—But, he makes, it seems, the countries he has *conquered* assist him in new conquests. Aye, my Lord Palmerston, this is quite another thing! The people whom he has conquered are his subjects, as much as the people in Guadeloupe are the subjects of our king. I should have no objection to employing troops of this sort. Troops of conquered countries would not be foreign troops. When you can shew me, that it is troops of conquered countries that we are employing, I shall be easy; but this is what you cannot shew me; for we have conquered no countries that produce troops.—Therefore, we do not follow the example of the Emperor of France; there is no similarity between his proceedings, in this respect, and those of our government. The officers as well as men, employed by Napoleon, are his subjects; they are not foreigners; they owe him allegiance; and have no temptation to betray him; and, as to the Spaniards employed by him in the North of Europe, they were auxiliaries, they were paid by their own government, and were not mercenaries hired and paid by him.—But, in fact, all this is beside the question, which relates to the employing of *foreign Officers to command English troops and English counties*. To make it out, therefore, that we imitate the example of Buonaparté, it must be shown, that he puts *foreigners to command French troops and French Departments*; and this, I believe, no one will attempt to show. No one, bold as he may be, will attempt to hazard an assertion, that this is the fact. If it can be shown, that foreigners, and foreign mercenaries too, are set over Frenchmen, and set to command on the staff in the Departments of France, then I shall allow, that the example of Buonaparté has been followed by our government; but, until then I shall allow no such thing.—Mr.

Perceval denied, that *Frenchmen*, except by mere accident, were enlisted from the prisons to serve in our army. But, did he not perceive, that *Italians*, *Brabanters*, *Dutchmen*, and some *Germans*, might be the subjects of Napoleon or his allies as well as *Frenchmen*? Or, did he mean to consider, that the people *conquered* by Napoleon owed him no allegiance? Lord Palmerston seemed, at any rate, to view the matter in a different light; for, as an objection to the return of the names of the foreign officers serving in our native regiments, he observed, "that many of them *had connexions abroad who might be brought into jeopardy*;" meaning, of course, that their relations were in the countries under the sway of Napoleon. This might be true; it, undoubtedly, was true; but, did my Lord Palmerston perceive what a stab this was to his own argument in defence of employing these people? For, if their relations and estates (if they have any) be in the power of Napoleon, is it to be expected, that they, in an hour of trial, will hazard their lives into the bargain in opposing him? If the danger to their families be such that it is improper to make known their names, what is to be expected from them in the way of hostility to him, if an hour of great peril should arrive? If they be afraid to have their names known to him, what must be their fears to oppose him in a desperate manner? This was one of the objections, which, in my defence against Gibbs's speech, I urged against employing these men. I said, that Buonaparte was in possession of their country: that he, or his brother, was the sovereign of their country by conquest; and, that they must well know, that the way of ensuring exclusion for ever from that country was to oppose him with zeal and courage; which notion perfectly corresponds with that of Lord Palmerston.—Then, on the other hand, what is the situation of these men, with regard to our government? Why, that government may send them, or any of them, out of the country *under the Alien Act*, at a moment's warning! Yes, Baron Linsingen, at the very moment that he was reviewing the regiments of English militia in the Eastern District, might have been seized by a King's Messenger, or Police Officer, and taken to Harwich and shipped off to the continent; or, at least, compelled to ship himself off to some foreign country without delay.—Now, I put it to the reader, whether any man thus situated,

ought to be intrusted with the command of any portion of our country; whether such a man ought to be employed upon the Staff in this kingdom; whether such a man ought to be set over Englishmen to command them, and that, too, in their own country? An English General may, it is true, be displaced by the sole will of the government; he may be stripped of his office, his rank, and his pay, without even a court-martial. But then, he is in his own country; he is amongst his friends and his countrymen; he has a resource; he cannot be utterly ruined and sent to wander over the face of the earth; or, perhaps, driven into the hands of him against whom he has been serving, who claims him as his subject, and who is prepared to punish him accordingly. Here, therefore, is another powerful reason for not employing these men at all, but especially for not employing them in the command of English troops and English counties.—It is said, that the number of these officers is few, and that they are scattered about amongst a great many corps. But, why any at all? When a thing is wrong in its nature, the degree is no justification. Besides, what assurance have we that the number will not increase? It is only about seven years since these people were first brought into the country; and, they have already, as we have seen, got possession of a very considerable portion of the command. Baron Linsingen is second in command in the Eastern District; his son is an Aide de Camp in that District. The *Baron de Montalembert* is Assistant Quarter Master General in the Sussex District; in which capacity, observe, he ought to be well acquainted with the survey of the coast, and ought to know all the roads, and the country, and every thing appertaining to the landing or moving an army in that most exposed part of the Island. Now, has this man brought us any soldiers with him? He does not, I believe, even belong to any foreign corps, though he has the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Where, then, can have been the reason for putting him in this post of great trust and of dangerous knowledge?—Another remarkable instance is that of *Baron W. Twyll*, who, in the Gazette of 13th of February last, was appointed Lieutenant Colonel of the 25th Regiment of Light Dragoons, *without purchase*. This Baron Twyll was Major in the 7th Light Dragoons, in which *Lord Paget* is Colonel, and was allowed to exchange into the Corsican Rangers, by which he must have gained, I suppose,

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a considerable sum of money. He was never, I am told, obliged to join the Rangers; and, he has now been appointed a Lieutenant Colonel in the Dragoons without purchase!—If, as I said before, Officers were scarce with us, it would be another matter; if we had no men in the country with talents sufficient for such a post; if we were a wretched cowardly people, incapable of defending ourselves; then there would be something to say in defence of all this; and, indeed, to defend it, its advocates must insist that such is our situation and our character.—I perceive, in the Morning Chronicle of the 31st of March, a letter, signed “*An Unprejudiced Englishman*,” finding fault with what has been said in parliament upon this subject; and, agreeably to my constant practice, I will here insert that letter before I make any remark upon its contents.—“Much having been said lately in both Houses of Parliament, respecting the employing of Foreigners as Officers in our own regiments, or on the staff of the army, I was curious to see what were those men against whom so much jealousy was entertained. I, therefore, referred to the Army List, (published by Authority) and the result of my researches, as well as of the information I have given myself the trouble to collect, is, that with the exception of one or two instances, the Foreigners that hold commissions in English regiments, in number not exceeding ten or twelve, are all young men, bred up and educated in England from their earliest infancy, knowing no other country, and having no other habits but those common to Englishmen; most of them of ancient though unfortunate nobility, whose families were the victims of a revolution that no human power could control. Surely it would not be in unison with the well known liberality of the English character, to deprive those individuals of the opportunity of showing themselves worthy of the country which has given them an asylum and an education. Let us recollect the advantages Louis XVI. derived from the services of Marshal Berwick, an Englishman! and the glory that attended the arms of Leopold the First under the Prince Eugene, a Frenchman! I am far from approving the employing of Foreigners in preference to Natives; nor do I think it has ever been the case. But when a few individuals, whose only crime consists in being born on the other

side of the channel, have by their talents and exertions been so fortunate as to be distinguished and promoted in our army, is it not harsh and unjust in the extreme, to grudge them the advantages they may have gained by serving our country with zeal and fidelity?”—This letter is written by a foreigner. We do not say “under the Prince Eugene.” We say, under “Prince Eugene,” without the article. This “unprejudiced Englishman” should, therefore, have got somebody to put his letter into English.—But, who, pray, are these persons, who have been bred up and educated here? They are, it would seem, Frenchmen; and if so, what becomes of the defence set up, that the persons in question are “no more than Germans?” We are further told, that they have been “victims of a revolution which no human power could control,” and, that they are sprung from an ancient, though unfortunate nobility.” Now, all this clearly means, that the persons whom this writer has in view are Frenchmen. In any, or almost any, situation, except that of serving in our army or navy, or being consulted by our rulers, I should not dislike these gentlemen on account of their being Frenchmen, who, of all the nations of the continent, are unquestionably the best. But, God forbid, that I should consent to commit the defence of England to a Frenchman! And, it is really singular enough, that there should be persons willing to do this, while those very persons are incessantly railing, not only against Frenchmen, but also against the French character; while men, who, like me, are ready to express admiration of that character, because justice demands it, would not trust a Frenchman an inch in any thing wherein our country is placed in opposition to his.—As to the cases of Marshal Berwick and Prince Eugene, they do not at all apply to us. We want no foreign commanders. We have produced good commanders enough of our own. We do not assimilate with foreigners. We are a race of ourselves; and if we and our Islands cannot get on without a mixture with foreigners, we had better give up the contest at once.—Besides, I must say, that I dislike to see any weight at all given to French Emigrants. Not because they are unfortunate; not because they may have committed errors; but, because they are ever apt to endeavour to widen the breach between us and France. Peace, which, surely, we must have

sometime or other, is death to them. They can breathe no air which is not hostile to Buonaparté. We owe no small part of our present calamities to the mistaken notions and boiling animosity of those persons, who, having nothing to risk themselves, are constantly bent upon fomenting war and destruction. They have, too, in some cases, pretty openly meddled with our domestic concerns. I have heard of one of their *great leaders*, who refused to see a member of parliament, *because that member had taken part against the Duke of York*; and, there was another, who had the impudence to publish an abusive attack upon Major Cartwright, *because he called for a reform of parliament*. This man nosed Major Cartwright in his own neighbourhood in the country; pointed him out as a Jacobin, and as a proper object for the vengeance of the government! Experience has not taught these people justice or moderation; and, therefore, I am not the more disposed to admit them to have the command of Englishmen, on account of their belonging to the ancient nobility of France, whose families "fell victims to a revolution, indeed, "which no human power could control" when it was once on foot, but which was set on foot by the oppression and insolence of those nobility themselves, who, by their obstinacy in yielding nothing to the people, induced the people to take every thing, and who now curse Napoleon for having put an end to that anarchy of which their own injustice and pride were the cause; or, at any rate, it is hard to say what else they can curse him for, seeing that his sceptre, compared to what theirs was, is light as a feather."—Besides, what is there to encourage us to employ the nobility of France as commanders of our own men and of our counties? They made no great figure in the defence of their own country; nor in their attempts to regain it after it was lost. We have heard much of their high and ancient blood, but where has it discovered its superiority? The common people of France have sent forth more great generals than all the nobility of Europe taken together. If this gentleman had told us, that the foreigners in our service were relations of Lannes and Massena and Pichegru and Jourdan and St. Cyr and Mortier and Soult and Victor and Suchet and Brune; if he had told us that the foreigners put over Englishmen were of this breed, we might have allowed him to have something like reason on his side,

though, even then, I should have objected to the employing of them; but, to tell us, and that, too, in the way of recommendation, that the persons employed by our government to command Englishmen, are descendants of those who were unable to defend their own country, seems to me to argue a great contempt for the public understanding, or, a great want of understanding in the writer himself. But, the truth is, these persons are incorrigible. It is a species of insanity under which they labour; for, while to the senses of every body else, there has a radical change taken place in France, they seem to look upon their titles and feudal rights only to be withheld from them for a time, and, I verily believe, they fully expect to return to them. Much good may their dream do them; but, let them not, in the meanwhile, delude, or, at any rate, command, Englishmen.—There remains but one point for me to touch upon, and that is, the *enlisting of men out of the prisons*. Sir Francis Burdett had observed: "if we "thought that we had a right to execute "the men taken at the Isle of France as "traitors, why should we inveigle foreigners, who were in our prisons to "join our army?" Now, what was the answer to this? The words reported to have been uttered by Mr. Perceval were these: "The Honourable Baronet seemed "to think it a monstrous thing, that we "should punish as traitors subjects of this "country enlisting in the service of the "enemy, while we ourselves enlist foreigners into our service. For his part, "the difference appeared to him so great, "that he could see no analogy between the "cases. For example, if, instead of sending to Spain those Spanish troops which "France had forcibly obliged to march to "Denmark, we had enlisted them into "our service, could any man say that there "would be any resemblance between the "Spaniards entering into our service under such circumstances, and our own "subjects entering into that of the enemy? "It was the same with all foreigners whom "we enlisted in our service. It might "happen accidentally, that a Frenchman "might enlist by describing himself as a "German, but the Government never "wished any Frenchman to be enlisted; "they only wished to enlist men from "those countries which France most unjustly oppresses, and whose population "she forces into her armies."—And this you call answering, do you, Mr. Perceval?

You compare an auxiliary army in garrison to prisoners of war in a jail. The Spanish troops, of which you speak, were an army of auxiliaries, paid by Spain, under Spanish Commanders, and Spain was in alliance with France when this army took the field. That alliance ceased; Spain became the enemy of France; and, if we had enlisted those Spaniards into our service, they would not have been guilty of any breach of faith with regard to France; for, they never were in the service of France; they never took the pay of France; they never were under the banners of Bonaparté; they never contracted any engagement with him. But, is this the case with "all the foreigners whom we enlist into our service?" Is it, reader? Is this the case with the men who were enlisted out of the prisons to go and join the 10th (or Prince of Wales's own) regiment of dragoons? Is this the case with any man who is enlisted out of prison? Has not every prisoner been found under the banners of Napoleon, having contracted engagements with him, and receiving his pay? What similarity, what resemblance, even the most distant, is there between such men and the Spanish troops under Romana?—We are told, in this speech of Mr. Perceval, that we do not take *Frenchmen* out of the prisons, except by mere accident; and that our government "only wished to enlist men from those countries which France most unjustly oppresses and whose population she forces into her armies." These are very pretty words: it is easy to talk about the oppressions of France, and about her forcing people into her service: it is easy enough to declaim in this way; but, what is really meant by it? What is it worth, when we come to sift it a little? France oppresses countries, does she; and she makes the people of those countries go into her armies? You, Mr. Perceval, have given no proof of these oppressions; you have cited no facts to shew that these oppressions exist; nor have you cited any fact to shew, that the people of the countries alluded to are compelled against their will to enter the service of France. It is assertion unsupported by any proof, any argument, or any probability. But, admit all you say as to these points to be true; and, then answer me, when you have leisure, the following questions. 1. Do not conquered countries owe allegiance to the conqueror? 2. Are not the people of these countries the subjects of the conqueror? 3. If they rise

against him, are they not rebels? 4. If they conspire against him or adhere to his enemies, are they not traitors? 5. Does oppression give people a right to adhere to the enemies of a sovereign power? This last is a pincher; and, therefore, I wish you to take time to answer it. Does oppression, I say, justify a people in adhering to the enemies of their ruler, be he who he may? Be he who he may, mind; because sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. 6. Does the circumstance of a man's being forced into a service (pray mind what I am asking here); does, I say, the circumstance of a man's being forced into a service (no matter how he may be forced or what it may be called); but, does that circumstance, I say, justify that man in joining the enemy as soon as he can find an opportunity?—Now, if you say, that conquered countries do not owe allegiance to the conqueror; that the people of such countries are not his subjects; that if they rise against him, they are not rebels; that if they conspire against him or adhere to his enemies, they are not traitors; that oppression does give any people a right to call in or assist the enemy of their oppressive rulers; and that if a man be forced into any service he has a right to go over to the enemy as soon as he can find an opportunity: if you say all this, then I allow, admitting for argument's sake that the countries conquered by Napoleon are oppressed, and that these men are forced into his service; then I allow, that, consistently with the principles on which the Isle of France men were condemned to have their bowels ripped out and their carcasses cut in quarters, these foreigners may be enlisted out of the prisons into our service; but this I can never allow unless you agree to all the premises.—We choose to regard Holland, and all the other countries conquered by France, as not belonging to Napoleon, as nations, whom he is at war with, and severely oppressing; the people of those countries, taken into his service, we choose to regard as a sort of prisoners of war carried about by his armies. Nothing will undeceive us. Even the Polish Lancers have not been able to convince us that they are not actually in prison in the French camps.—Thus do we gull ourselves; but, while we are at perfect liberty to do that, we shall not convince Napoleon, or any body else, that acts of treason can be committed against no rulers but ours. We are a fine people! Verily, a matchless people! But, we shall

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not persuade the world, that no rulers but ours can have treason committed against them.—It is hardly worth while to add any remark upon the absurdity of supposing, that whole armies, and most valiant and successful armies too, are composed of men forced away from their country, that country having been first conquered and oppressed by the persons who forced them away. This absurdity is too gross, it is too low to argue against. The fact, I dare say, is, that great numbers of the Germans in our prisons are willing to get out of them on almost any conditions, not being supported in their affliction by the same spirit that the native French are. But, if this be the case, what reason is there to suppose, that these men will be faithful to us? What reason is there to suppose, that they will not, on the first occasion, rejoin the enemy?—Here closes the discussion of this subject for the present, waiting for the return moved for by Lord Folkestone, and which return ought to give us information of every foreigner now serving in English regiments, and also upon the staff in this country.—There are many people, who would consent to the employment of foreign corps, but would shut foreigners out of our own regiments. In the debate above-mentioned “General Tarleton observed, that as to obtaining returns of the foreigners in our service, of which the Right Hon. Gentleman doubted the possibility, nothing was more easy; for there were annual returns given in to the War-office from every regiment, which specified the age, size, birth, and country of every man in the army. With regard to the general principle of employing foreigners in the army, he would only say, that if the war was continued on its present extensive scale, we could hardly have too many foreigners in our service; but they ought to be kept in separate battalions: for as to taking Germans and other foreigners into our native regiments, he could not too much reprobate the practice; it was like mixing up the base metals with our own fine gold and silver. The Germans, as a people, had been overrun and degraded by the French; and did any body suppose that our native troops, fighting for their own soil, would be overcome like the Prussians and others? He would say, then, take as many troops into your service as you please, but keep them distinct, and call them *mercenaries*.” —There is

a little too much of the brag here about the “fine gold and silver;” but, I am for employing of no foreigners at all. I would not have them any where; but, I would certainly never suffer them to set their foot in England; and what, then, must I feel at seeing them commanding English troops and English counties?—Lord Palmerston said, that “*the feelings of the country had much changed, on this subject, within the last century,*” than which, nothing more true was ever uttered. Those feelings have changed on a great many other subjects also; and the effect of that change we most justly experience. However, *Time*, the great rectifier of all things, is pushing on towards the period, when the consequences will be better known and more duly estimated.

BRISTOL ELECTION.—“Exhaustless “is the fountain of humbug!” A corrupt hireling press spreads falsehood as the clouds do showers; and, it is not much matter, whether it be corrupted by money or by party views, which, indeed, is, in the end, money.—Seldom has there appeared a more direct attempt at deception than has been made, in some of the London prints, respecting the reception of *Sir Samuel Romilly* at Bristol, where he has offered himself as a candidate at the next election.—An account of this reception and of the dinner which took place in consequence of it, on Thursday the 2nd instant, was published in the *Morning Chronicle* of the 7th, and, upon that account I shall now make some remarks, just premising here, that he was introduced to the city by a *Mr. Alderman Noble*, who lives in London, and that it had been, for some time, notified in the public prints, that The Rt. Hon. *George Tierney*, was to accompany Sir Samuel Romilly down, and was to preside at the dinner. I must further premise, that Dr. Tierney (he was made a Doctor at Oxford at the installation of Lord Grenville, whether of Divinity or not I do not know) did not go down, in which he acted a very prudent part, as will be seen in the sequel.—Now, then, we come to the account of this flattering reception, given in the *Morning Chronicle*, which account begins thus:—“In consequence of the invitation given by the friends of Sir Samuel Romilly to him, to dine with them at the Assembly Rooms, in Prince’s-street, in this city, on Thursday last, he arrived here about two o’clock that day.—Upon Sir Samuel

“ Romilly's arriving within a mile of the
 “ city, he was met by an immense con-
 “ course of the populace, with colours of
 “ the different trade societies, who in-
 “ sisted upon drawing his carriage to the
 “ Bush. When he had reached the Bush,
 “ *he addressed the populace from the win-*
 “ *dows; expressing his gratitude for the*
 “ *reception he had met with, and exhorting*
 “ *them to preserve harmony and peace.*
 “ — *After the company began to disperse,*
 “ Sir S. Romilly, attended by some of his
 “ friends, walked to the Assembly Rooms
 “ in Prince's-street, followed by a great
 “ number of the citizens; 241 sat down to
 “ dinner; M. Castle, Esq. was called to
 “ the Chair.”—This, I take upon me
 to say, is a *false* account; and wilfully so
 on the part of the person who drew it up.
 For, the belief intended to be produced, is,
 that Sir Samuel Romilly addressed the
 people and *was heard*; that, *as soon as he*
had done speaking, the people began to
 disperse; and that *there was no other*
speaking to the people upon this occasion,
 nor any interruption of any sort to the
 proceedings. Reader, is not this the fair
 meaning of the account thus far? Well,
 then, I assure you, that any thing more
 false never appeared even in a London
 news-paper.—I will relate to you what
 passed, and then you will be the better
 able to judge of the sincerity of the man
 who published this account.—Sir Sa-
 muel Romilly, when he came to the Bush
 Inn, went up into a front room, which has
 a bow-window; at which window he ap-
 peared, and was introduced to the people
 by Alderman Noble. That he attempted
 to address the people is certain, and it is
 also certain that he continued the attempt
 for about a quarter of an hour; but, it is
 no less certain, that not one word of what
 he said was heard by any one, except those
 persons who were in the room with him.
 The moment he made the motions of speak-
 ing, his voice was drowned in cries of,
 “ No Noble! no Six-and-eight-pence! no
 “ Tierney! no Placeman! no Pensioner!
 “ no Humbug! no Bloody-Bridge! no
 “ War! less Taxes!”—The people,
 who did not know Dr. Tierney personally,
 thought he was present; and the cry of,
 no Bloody-Bridge, was an allusion to the
 shooting of some Bristol people once, on a
 Bridge, by the military, under the orders
 of some one, who was present with Sir Sa-
 muel Romilly.—Now, I appeal to the
 reader, whether the account in the Morning
 Chronicle be not scandalously false. What

notion can its readers have of the real facts
 relating to Sir Samuel Romilly's reception at
 Bristol? The account is a cheat; it is in-
 tended to deceive the public; it is one of
 those thousands of frauds which are played
 off upon the people of this country every
 month in the year.—But, still, this is the
 smallest part of the demerit of this account.
 Who, upon reading it, would not conclude,
 that, when Sir Samuel Romilly's Address
 to the people was finished, they dispersed,
 and he and his party went to dinner; who
 would not, I say, imagine that this disper-
 sion took place as soon as Sir Samuel Ro-
 milly's speech was finished; or, at least,
 who would imagine that *any body else* ad-
 dressed the people? Now, then, reader,
 judge of the falsehood of this account when
 I have told you the truth.—Sir Samuel
 Romilly, finding it impossible to obtain a
 hearing, drew back from the window,
 where upon another of the Candidates, Mr.
 HUNT, mounted upon a table, or something
 about the same height, in the midst of the
 crowd, addressed the people for about *an*
hour and a half, with a profound attention
 on their part, and a silence never once in-
 terrupted but by shouts of applause.—
 Reader, was not this an incident worthy of
 notice in the account published in the Morn-
 ing Chronicle? Was this a matter to be
 passed over in silence? Yes, for, in the
 course of his address, Mr. Hunt went into
 an exposure of the conduct of the Whigs;
 he gave the history of their feats while in
 power; he dwelt upon the manner in
 which they had cheated the people; he
 shewed how they had pocketed the public
 money; he pointed out some of their par-
 ticular sinecures and pensions; in short, he
 stripped the cloak from them, and exhibit-
 ed them in their native deformity. No
 wonder, reader, that the friends of Sir Sa-
 muel Romilly and Dr. Tierney passed this
 part of the history of the day over in si-
 lence.—While Mr. Hunt was engaged in
 this exposure, the window of the room
 where Sir Samuel Romilly and his friends
 were was suddenly shut down. Let the
 reader judge of their mortification, when he
 is told, that the people compelled them to
 lift the window up again, and to endure the
 torture of hearing the truth!—This scene
 continued, as I said before, for about *an*
hour and a half, the crowd being immense,
 and growing greater and greater all the
 while, notwithstanding it rained incessant-
 ly. It was after this; it was after Mr.
 Hunt had been speaking all this while to
 attentive and applauding thousands; it was

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after these thousands had been removed by the conducting of him to his inn; it was after all this that Sir Samuel Romilly and his party went to dinner, having first been cheered by beholding the card with his name in it pulled out of hundreds of hats, by the weavers themselves, and torn to pieces.—This is the real history of the transaction. We are told, in this account, that Sir Samuel Romilly and his friends went from the Bush to the Assembly Rooms *after the crowd began to disperse*. An odd expression. The crowd would disperse, of course, when the speaking was over. This narrator knew the truth; he, you clearly see, had all the story in his head, but it suited him to suppress that part of it which related to the time of the crowd's dispersing, and the cause of their not dispersing sooner.—What I have here related, I, of course, have received from others; but, it has reached me through more than one or two channels; and, though my account may err in slight circumstances, my belief is, that it is substantially correct, and that, so far from exaggeration, it is, as to every fact unfavourable to the Whigs, much within the bounds which truth prescribes.—What, then, is the reader to think of a print that could publish such an account as that which I have quoted above? What is he to think of a print capable of uttering falsehoods like this? In the history of the events of this day the most important of them all are wholly sunk out of sight; and the reader of the account is made to believe, upon the whole, that which is precisely the opposite of the truth.—What passed at *the dinner* is hardly worth notice. The applause received from a man's own professed partisans is of little consequence. It is, however, curious to remark, that the health of Mr. Doctor *Tierney* was given next after that of Sir Samuel Romilly himself. This alone was enough to characterize the meeting. The toasting of a professed place-hunter could give no other idea than that of an assemblage of place-hunters; a miserable crew, eager to get at a mouthful of the taxes. The Doctor was prudent in not attending, and in sending a *letter* to supply his place. He would have found rather warmer work at Bristol than he found in the Borough. It would have been realizing almost literally, the old saying, "out of the frying pan into the fire." Dr. Tierney is said to have written a letter, "which was *highly* expressive [what does "that mean?"] of his regret at being under

"the influence at that moment of such particular engagements as detained him in London, and was replete with assurances of his *high* regard and esteem for his "worthy friend Sir Samuel Romilly." This is, to be sure, most despicable nonsense; but, can it be true, that Sir Samuel Romilly stands in need of a recommendation from Mr. Tierney! From the man, who, in consequence of his having abandoned the principles on which he was elected, was ousted from the Borough of Southwark with every mark of indignation! Can Sir Samuel Romilly stand in need of the recommendation of the man, who was amongst the foremost to defend the conduct of Perceval and Castlereagh, and to oppose the motion of Mr. Maddock upon the subject of the seat of *Quintin Dick*? These are, in faith, goodly auspices under which to make his first appearance amongst those whom he wished to represent.—Mr. *Alderman Noble*'s name was not, it seems, mentioned at the dinner, though he was the person, as I understand, to introduce Sir Samuel Romilly.—The two *Members for Bristol* were toasted; and why not? Messrs. *Baillie* and *Bragge Bathurst* are just as good as Dr. Tierney. This further marks the character of the meeting. These friends of Sir Samuel Romilly are, it seems, very willing to join with *any body* against the friends of Freedom." *Lord Grenville*, "the *chosen* advocate of *national conciliation*," was another toast. What did they mean by "national conciliation;" and, if they alluded to the Catholic Claims, how could they call him the "chosen advocate" of them? Who have chosen him? They would have been more consistent and more honest, if they had toasted him as the advocate of the "sedition Bills" and "Double Sinécures." These place-hunters would not have toasted Lord Grenville if they had been within the hearing of the suffering thousands, whose labour is taxed to pay the enormous sinécures of his family. Snug within the walls of their dining room, they dared to utter these insults upon the people, for which, I trust, they will have cause to repent before the close of the next poll that will be taken at Bristol.—At this dinner I am much surprised to see *Dr. Parr* make his appearance. I should have thought, that he had had enough of elections after that memorable instance of his wisdom and gratitude, *his letter to Sir Francis Burdett*, at the time of the last Middlesex Election but one. However, it must be confessed, that,

after the recommendation of Mr. Tierney, Sir Samuel Romilly had not much to dread from that of Dr. Parr, or any body else. —To conclude, Sir Samuel Romilly, as well from the company that he was in, as from the whole tenour of his speech at the dinner (which speech I will notice more fully hereafter), appears to have made up his mind to go through with the Whigs. He seems to have formed a settled design not to deviate from the old beaten track of that party; and, of course, the people of Bristol, if they were to elect him, would have no more to expect from him than from any of the members that they have heretofore chosen. Not a word was uttered at this dinner about *parliamentary reform*. That touchstone of political principle was completely blinked; and, if the report be correct, Sir Samuel Romilly told the company, that he was not only willing to take place again; but, that he should be *better able to serve them* in place than out of place; thereby avowing, it seems to me, the corrupt principle of ministerial influence. —I shall return to this subject, which appears to be growing into importance. Bristol is the third city in England in point of population; and, with right notions, the people may do much at the next election.

PRINCESS REGENT.—In the Morning Chronicle of the 26th instant there was a paragraph, stating that it was the intention of some one to bring forward in the Common Hall of the City of London, a proposition to address the Princess Regent upon the present occasion, and to pray her to take upon her the state and dignity belonging to her situation. In remarking upon this paragraph, the Courier news-paper (a despised hireling print) of the same day, after abusing, in the foulest terms, the Liberator of London, adds the following very curious observations, to which I solicit the reader's attention.—“What the nature
“of that delicate motion may be, relative
“to the Princess of Wales, we know not—
“what state they would have her assume—
“whether they would wish to *drive the*
“*QUEEN from Windsor Castle to her villa*
“*of Frogmore*, and make the Princess
“take her place—whether, because they
“cannot carry an insulting address to the
“PRINCE on the Throne, they would have
“the PRINCESS *receive them on the Throne*,
“and return them thanks for every insult-
“ing expression to her husband, we are
“yet to learn. Before, however, they in-

“trude their congratulations or condolence,
“we know not which—before they make
“the differences between man and wife the
“subject of their decorous debates, and
“their delicate petitions, *it may be well*
“*for them to inquire of the late Ministers,*
“*whether the Act of Separation between the*
“*illustrious Personages in question, did*
“*not receive the signature of the King him-*
“*self, and of every member of the late Ca-*
“*binet?*”——Now, it is here clearly
hinted, that there was actually a separation between the parties. But, this must be false; for, if the reader will look back, he will find Mr. Perceval declaring, that there was no intention even now to recommend a separation. This, therefore, is a base attempt to insinuate away that reputation which Mr. Perceval most solemnly declared to be spotless. This is, indeed, excessively foul; this is what the wretch who wrote this article, or dictated it, would not dare to attempt against the reputation of any married woman in private life. It is here, in fact, asserted, that there was an act of separation; than which, as the reader may be assured, nothing can be more false, and certainly nothing was ever more wicked. It is cowardly in the extreme. It is an act worthy of the most pusillanimous, the most enervated, the basest of all mankind; it is an act worthy of a creature having not one drop of manly blood left within him; an animal that has no vigour left, either of body or mind, except in the exercise of malignity; a wretch effete for all purposes but those of indulging envy and hatred. —Yes, reader, this insinuation is false, false as the heart whence it must have proceeded; and you may be assured that it has been made use of by the cowardly author, for the purpose of preventing the City from presenting an Address to her Royal Highness, for which, so far from my seeing any objection to it, I can perceive very solid grounds; and especially since I have seen it stated, in some of our daily prints, *that the Queen is about to hold drawing rooms*, a fact which I do not and cannot believe; but the bare circumstance of which fact having been stated in print, makes it necessary that some step should be taken to convince the Princess Regent, that the public are not indifferent to her fate, and that the insinuations of these writers have not succeeded in misleading them. It is not enough for them to be convinced of the falsehood of the articles in question; it is necessary for them to shew her, and to shew the whole world, indeed, that they are so

convinced; and, at the same time, to set the mark of their reprobation upon the cowardly attempts of her enemies.—The Morning Post news-paper foretells, that, if the City of London do address the Princess, she will look upon it as a step taken for the annoyance of her husband, and will treat it with contempt accordingly.—Ah! say you so, hireling!—This foretelling what will happen is one way of conveying advice; and the Princess is here advised what to do; she is advised to treat the address of the city with contempt, because, she ought to look upon it as a step taken to annoy her husband.—Here is a great deal assumed; for, according to the account given in the Morning Chronicle of Mr. Alderman Wood's intention, and, indeed, from the manly character of the Alderman itself, there is not the smallest reason to suppose, that the address in contemplation will contain any thing calculated to wound or annoy His Royal Highness, unless, indeed, we were to suppose (which we ought not), that he would be annoyed at hearing the Citizens of London offer, upon this occasion, a compliment to the virtues of his wife, the mother of his daughter and of our future sovereign, and at hearing them express a hope, that she will assume that state in public which belongs to her present situation. This is what the Morning Chronicle tells us is to be the subject of the Address; and, are we to believe, that such an address, presented to the Princess, would annoy her husband? Are we to believe, that he would think himself insulted by such an address to his wife? Are we to believe, that he carries his antipathy so far as to be annoyed at seeing that any portion of the people retain a respect for this personage, once so flattered and caressed? I trust, that we are not to believe any thing so unjust and ungenerous in him, who, I dare say, would be amongst the first to rejoice at seeing the Princess receive the contemplated compliment. But, if we could suppose it to be otherwise; if, for argument's sake (for it cannot be real), we were to admit, that the Prince would be wounded at seeing an address presented to the Princess; if we could suppose that he carried his antipathy to this pitch, which, I say, is not to be believed; but, if we could suppose it, could we also suppose, that the Princess would *reject* that address; and, that she would reject it, too, because her husband was annoyed by it; that she would reject it, *because* her husband was annoyed at her receiving a mark of respect?—Oh!

no, Mr. Morning Post, this is not to be believed, or supposed; the idea is not to be entertained for a moment. It is so contrary to the dictates of nature, that it is not to be believed; and, if the advice of the Morning Post were followed by the Princess, does he believe that the world would attribute her rejection of the address to the refined notion of resenting an annoyance offered to her husband? If he do, he is very much deceived. The world would attribute it to a *very different cause*, of which, however, I shall say no more, being quite certain, that the case will not occur, the Princess having, from all that I have heard, too much courage to be daunted by the threats, and too much sense to be cajoled by the wheedling, of those who are now, as we see, using all sorts of devices to keep her out of sight.—It has been said, that such an address is a thing unprecedented; that it is a thing sought after; that it is an out-of-the-way step. It is strange to see how men's inclinations pervert every thing. The fact is, that an omission to address the Princess, upon such an occasion, would be unprecedented. She was addressed by the City of London upon her marriage; she was addressed by them upon the birth of her daughter; and why should she not be addressed now? Her husband has been addressed upon his coming to the Regency, and why not his wife? If the king were to die, would they not address her upon her coming to the throne? Would they not address her upon her being crowned, as she must be with her husband? Why, then, upon this occasion only, is she to pass unaddressed? Where is there a creature above the rank of a milliner, who is not presented at court upon her marriage, or her husband's promotion? And, is no notice at all to be taken of the change in the rank of the Princess of Wales, who, in fact, is now standing in the place of the Queen, as the Prince is in that of the king?—In short, there appear to me to be numerous good reasons for the Address and not one reason against it; and, therefore, it has my cordial approbation, as I am sure it will that of nine hundred and ninety-nine persons out of every thousand in the country. The enemies of the Princess Regent may flatter themselves, that the nation care nothing about her. Those enemies, however, are very much deceived, and that they will find as often as there is an opportunity of putting the matter to the test. The Princess has the women, she has the

married women, on her side; and her enemies may take my word for it, that whoever has the women need not be much concerned about the men.

CITY OF LONDON PETITION.—The *Resolutions* of the Common Hall (of 26th March) were inserted in my Number before the last, at page 411. An Address and Petition founded on these Resolutions was prepared, and the Sheriffs waited upon the Regent to know when he would receive the Livery with it. But, they were informed, that he should not receive the Livery, but should follow, in this respect, the example of his father.—In consequence of this another Common Hall was held on the 7th instant; at which it was resolved, amongst other things, that the Address and Petition should be published in the news-papers; and that the Resolutions of the Livery, upon the refusal to receive their Petition upon the throne, should be carried by the Sheriffs and the Remembrancer and put into the hands of the Prince.—I shall below insert, first the Address and Petition, and then the Resolutions; and when the reader has gone through them, he will be able to decide, whether there is that *poverty of talent* in a Common Hall, which the hired news-papers have asserted to exist. The hired print, the Courier, talks of the “Shop-keepers” who take the lead at the Common Halls. His employers forget, apparently, that Marshal Brune, who cannonaded in Holland against the Duke of York, was, by Mallet du Pan, asserted to have been a Printer’s Boy; they forget that Soult and Victor and Junot and Massena and Marmont and Suchet, &c. were private soldiers. But, as to the “Shop-keepers,” here are their productions; here is a specimen of what they are capable of. By their works let the world judge of their fitness to discuss political matters.

WM. COBBETT.

*State Prison, Newgate,
Friday, 10th April, 1812.*

THE ADDRESS AND PETITION.

(agreed to 26th March, 1812.)

We, the Lord Mayor, Aldermen and Livery of the city of London, in Common Hall assembled, deeply feeling the distressed and calamitous state of the country, humbly approach your Royal Highness, dutifully to represent those grievances and abuses under which we labour, and of

which we have so long and ineffectually complained.—It is nearly a century since the family of your Royal Highness succeeded to the British throne, under principles and constitutional regulations which happily promised to secure the succession on the only sure basis of thrones—the liberties and affections of subjects.—The history of nations does not afford a better exemplification of the effects of the principles of a free constitution, than the state of those kingdoms at the close of the reign of the second Monarch of your illustrious House. Public liberty was established and respected—the national character was in consequence exalted at home and abroad—a war for national objects was carried on with unexampled glory—and the true interests of the people had been so wisely consulted and maintained, that the successor to the throne congratulated himself on the prosperous and auspicious circumstances under which he found his kingdom.—How unhappy the reverse! produced by a subsequent system, which generated a petty and disguised warfare on the rights and privileges of the people—which gave to the influence of patronage and corruption the name of Government—which depended for support on venal majorities in both Houses of Parliament—and which polluted the principal authorities of the State, and sacrificed the public weal to despicable intrigues and the cupidity of individuals. Liberty was invaded—the press, the terror only of bad Governments, was fettered and persecuted—the country was torn by factions—corruption raised itself above the law and the constitution—and the American war and the dissection of the Empire, were the consequences!—Similar feelings and policy led to an unhappy interference with the affairs of a neighbouring nation, and a war of 20 years, undertaken and continued without any settled or intelligible object, has dissipated the industry—destroyed the commerce—dried up the resources—curtailed the liberties—and nearly worn down the spirit of a brave and loyal people.—Although we have for a series of years, by Petitions to the Throne and to both Houses of Parliament, made earnest representations of our grievances, and fully anticipated the lamentable consequences of perseverance in so corrupt and vitiated a system, yet all our complaints have remained, not only undressed, but the same pernicious measures are still pursued—the same corrupt influence predominates—the same abuses are continued—and the evils of which we have

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so frequently complained, are rapidly and fearfully accumulating.—We have seen, on the part of your Royal Highness's Ministers, the some profligate expenditure—the same disregard of the sufferings of the people—a determined resistance to every measure tending to the reformation or investigation of abuses—and the same unbending and bigoted rigour, in withholding from a large mass of our fellow subjects the due exercise of their civil and political rights.—We have seen the wanton introduction of foreign mercenaries into our army—new and dangerous encroachments on the liberty of the press—of the independence on Juries—on the right of petitioning—on those laws and practices which, since the Revolution, have served as the bases of religious liberty. We have seen our merchants and manufacturers involved in bankruptcy and ruin, and tens of thousands of our artisans, who till lately formed the strength of the country, reduced to beggary and wretchedness, by a new and impolitic system of forced regulations in regard to commerce.—We have seen an arbitrary and delusive paper currency usurp the place of the natural and valid circulation of the precious metals—tokens of base coins substituted for the current coin of the realm—and consequent distrust and uncertainty arise in all our mercantile transactions.—We have seen your Ministers advise appointments to high and responsible stations, which, however in unison with your fraternal feelings, were in direct opposition to the declared sense of the nation, and irritating to a people who have shewn no bounds in their concessions to your Royal House.—We have seen another appointment made by the same Ministers, in defiance of votes of the House of Commons, evidently tending to bring your Royal Highness into discredit with the Legislature and the people. And, as if it had been designed to set at defiance all public feeling, and to give at once a death-blow to all patriotism, confidence, and hope, we have seen the weak and culpable author of the disastrous Expedition to Walcheren restored to place and power.—In fine, we have seen many things done by those Ministers repugnant to the Constitution—oppressive to the People—and disgraceful to the Government; and we have seen nothing effected, or even attempted, towards the reform of abuses, the abridgment of corruption, the curtailment of useless expenditure, or the amelioration of the condition of the People.—While we witnessed with indignation the preponderance

of this disgraceful system, we could not dismiss from our minds the fond recollection of those constitutional principles which your Royal Highness was believed to cherish, and which were confirmed by your own declarations: and we were, consequently, led to hope, that on your unrestricted accession to power, our complaints would have been attended to, and our grievances redressed; that, under your wise and beneficent auspices, we should have recovered some of our lost rights and privileges; and that we should have had the satisfaction to behold in you a Patriot Prince, surrounded by a grateful and happy People.—Sustained by that hope, we found consolation under our accumulated sufferings, in the confidence that, at that period, we should happily witness a change in the system of domestic Government and in the foreign policy of the Empire, produced by able and enlightened councils, rendered worthy of your own and your people's confidence by their known enmity to corruption—by their self-denial in bad times—and by their good faith, courage, and virtue, to effectuate those necessary reforms, upon which depends the safety of the Constitution and the Country.—That period, therefore, was expected with anxiety as the dawn of a new era; but even as our hopes were great, so our disappointment was excessive, when we learnt—that notwithstanding all the past—notwithstanding those grievances which we have so often set forth—notwithstanding the declared obnoxiousness of those Ministers to yourself and the nation—and notwithstanding their admitted malversations and corruptions—you were pleased to declare you had no predilections to indulge, or resentments to gratify!—Precious words in the mouth of a Prince, in regard to subjects having equal pretensions to public virtue, but inapplicable, it is presumed, to your present Ministers, whose corruptions are as notorious as the sun at noon-day—who have evinced a total disregard of all public principles—and whose practices have been chiefly directed to the corruption of Parliament, and their own personal aggrandizement.—At the same time we beg distinctly to disclaim any desire to promote the views, or interests, of any particular party in the State, fully convinced that no change of men can be attended with any beneficial effect, without an entire and radical change of system: that all intrigues, compromises, and combinations, to obtain or retain place and power, are dangerous and delusive, necessarily implying an aban-

donment of principle, destroying public confidence, and justly exciting a distrust of all public men; and that it is only by a wise, independent, unpensioned Administration, and a free and unpensioned Parliament, that the great interests of the Nation can be upheld.—Feeling, Sir, that the welfare of this great Empire is identified with the true interests of the Throne, we humbly and earnestly pray, that your Royal Highness will dismiss your present evil advisers, and call into the public service such men, and such men only, as stand pledged to your Royal Highness and to the Country, to promote those salutary reforms so imperiously required; to destroy that hydra of corruption, which is equally dangerous to Prince and People, domineering over the former, preying upon the latter, and obeying no law but its insatiable appetite: to correct those abuses which have taken root in every department of the Administration of the Government; to accomplish that radical and effectual Reform in the House of Commons, which should make it truly speak the independent and loyal feelings of the People, rather than remain the convenient engine of the sinister views of any Minister for the time being; or the organ of an hateful oligarchy, terrible alike to the Sovereign and the Country; to establish your Throne on a basis of justice in its relation to foreign nations; and to reconcile the ample enjoyment of their civil and religious liberties to your People, with the wholesome exercise of its necessary and legitimate prerogatives to the Crown.

HENRY WOODTHORPE.

RESOLUTIONS.

In a Meeting or Assembly of the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Liverymen of the several Companies of the City of London, in Common Hall assembled, at the Guildhall of the said City, on Tuesday the 7th day of April, 1812,—Resolved, I. That it appears, from immemorial usage, to have been the undisputed right of the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Livery of London, in Common Hall assembled, to present and read their Petitions and Remonstrances to their Sovereigns upon the Throne, and to receive answers to the same at the time of presentation.—II. That the right of Petitioning was asserted at the Revolution, and claimed, demanded, and insisted upon in the Bill of Rights, and is also secured by that clause of the Coronation Oath which pledges the Monarch to govern according to

the ancient laws and customs of the realm; a violation of which, in regard to the right of Petitioning, together with the seizure of the City's Charters, being among the outrages that led to the dethronement of the House of Stuart, and to the constitutional establishment of the House of Brunswick.

—III. That when Petitions are presented and read to the King upon the Throne, the Petitioners have the satisfaction of knowing that their complaints are heard; but when they are presented at the Levee, they are immediately delivered to the Lord in Waiting, and no answer given, nor have the Petitioners any assurance that their Petition is ever read, or its prayer known to the Sovereign.—IV. That this right, so essential to the good understanding which ought to subsist in a limited Monarchy, between a constitutional King and a free People, was never called in question till the Livery of London, in the year 1775, prepared a Remonstrance against the impolitic system at that time pursuing against their fellow-subjects in America, which Remonstrance, by counteracting the misrepresentations of wicked Ministers, might have prevented all the evils of the American War, had its arguments been allowed to reach the Royal Ear.—V. That, in like manner, this right was denied shortly after the commencement of the present ruinous, and, apparently, interminable war; when the Livery of London, feeling and foreseeing its calamitous consequences, sought to rescue their Sovereign and their country from the influence of those pernicious Councils which, for 20 years past, have filled the world with misery, and threaten to destroy the energies and resources of a great, brave, and loyal People.—VI. That the right of approaching the Throne with our representations and remonstrances, is not less important in the present alarming and complicated situation of the Empire; when, in addition to unparalleled difficulties and dangers, the Public Councils are destitute of character, and when an odious faction behind the Throne endangers the honour of the Sovereign, and insults the feelings of the Country.—VII. That at such a crisis, the obstruction that has been given to the effective presentation of our dutiful Petition and Remonstrance, is an aggravation of the public sufferings, and an inauspicious omen of the impending destiny of the Country, and could have been advised only by Ministers who are fearful of the effect of truth on the mind of their Sovereign, and who calculate on maintaining their power,

by keeping him in ignorance of the complaints and real condition of his subjects.

—VIII. That the only reason assigned for not receiving our Petitions, according to ancient usage, was contained in a Letter from Lord Hertford to John Wilkes, Esq. then Lord Mayor; wherein it is stated that the King has directed him to give notice, that for the future his Majesty will not receive on the Throne any Address, Remonstrance, and Petition, except from the body corporate; but it nevertheless does appear that two Addresses from the Court of Lieutenancy of this City have since been received by his Majesty on the Throne—one on the 16th of December, 1795, and the other on the 30th day of May, 1800—although the said Court of Lieutenancy does not constitute the Body Corporate of this City; while in October following a Petition was refused from the Livery, in whom are vested the more important rights of electing the Chief Magistrate, the Sheriffs, the Representatives in Parliament, the Chamberlain, the Auditors of the City Revenue, and other Officers.—IX. The advisers of the answer of the Regent, by which our Petition, as to all its useful purposes, has been rejected, have proved their enmity to the rights, privileges, and franchises of this City, their treachery to the honour and interests of the Crown, and their contempt of the public voice, as conveyed by the largest Corporate Assembly in the Empire.—

X. That our Representatives in Parliament be, and are hereby instructed to support all measures which have for their object the investigation and reformation of public abuses—the abolition of useless places, pensions, reversions, and superfluous establishments—the relief of the sufferings of the people, by re-opening the channels of commercial intercourse—the punishment of delinquents, however high their stations, and whether as traders in public appointments, or in seats in the Legislature—and, above all, the restoration of a full, equal, and free representation to the People.—XI. That the Sheriffs, attended by Mr. Remembrancer, do forthwith wait upon his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, and deliver into his Royal Highness's hand, in the name of the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Livery of London, a fair Copy of the foregoing Resolutions, signed by the Town Clerk.

—XII. That the Resolutions of this day, together with the Petition, agreed to on the 26th day of March last, be signed by the Town Clerk, and published in six Morning and six Evening Papers.—Resolved,

That the Thanks of the Common Hall be given to the Right Hon. the Lord Mayor, for his upright and impartial conduct this day.—Resolved—That the Thanks of this Common Hall be given to Samuel Birch, Esq. and William Heygate, Esq. Sheriffs, for their prompt attention to the directions of the Common Hall, at their last Meeting.—Resolved unanimously—That the Thanks of this Common Hall be given to Robert Waithman, Esq. and Samuel Favell, Esq. for their uniform and steady attachment to the Rights of their Fellow-Citizens, and for their zeal and abilities displayed on the present occasion.

WOODTHORPE.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

FRANCE.—*Reports laid before the Conservative Senate on the 10th of March, 1812.*

(Continued from page 448.)

—For a considerable time the English Government has proclaimed everlasting war,—a frightful project, which the wildest ambition could never really have intended, and which presumptuous boasting alone allowed to escape; a frightful project, which nevertheless will be realized, if France is but to expect engagements without guarantee,—of uncertain duration, and more disastrous than war itself.—Peace, Sire, which in the midst of your immense power has been so often offered to your enemies, will crown your glorious works, if England, banished from the Continent with perseverance, and separated from all the states whose independence she has violated, consents to return to those principles upon which European society is founded,—acknowledges the Law of Nations,—and respects the sacred rights consecrated by the treaty of Utrecht.—In the mean time, the French nation must remain armed: honour commands it; the interest, the rights, the independence of the people, engaged in the same cause, demand it; and an oracle still more certain, often delivered even from the mouth of your Majesty, constitutes it an imperious and sacred law.

II. *Report of the Minister of War to the Emperor and King, on the subject of augmenting the army, for the purpose of enforcing the Continental System.*

Sire,—The greatest part of your Majesty's troops had been called without our territory, for the defence of the grand in-

terests which are to ensure the preponderance of the empire, and maintain the Berlin and Milan Decrees so fatal to England. The continental system has scarcely been fifteen months in execution, and England is already at the last gasp. Had not events happened which your Majesty could not have expected, perhaps, in this short period of time, the prosperity of England would have been entirely annihilated; and convulsions would have been experienced in her interior, which would have finally thrown into discredit the war faction, and called to the Administration moderate men and friends of justice.—No person understands better than your Majesty, to expect from time, what time is to produce; and to maintain with unchangeable constancy, a system and plan of conduct from which you have calculated the results which are infallible.—During the absence of the greater part of our troops of the line, the immense number of maritime establishments, strong places, and important points of the empire, are guarded by the fifth battalions and the depots, and by the marine troops; which is attended with the inconvenience of diverting, by incessant marches and countermarches, the fifth battalions and depots from their proper destination, which are to supply the active armies. These marches fatigue the soldier and embarrass the administration. Besides, when such numerous armies are seen without the frontiers, the citizens who do not understand the measures taken by the Administration for the interior establishments, may feel some justifiable uneasiness; these inquietudes are of themselves contrary to the dignity of the Empire; these must be prevented from increasing, by the establishment of a constitutional force, for the defence of the territory alone.—By our constitutional laws, the national guard is specially charged with guarding the frontiers, our maritime establishments, our arsenals, and strong places; but the national guard, which embraces the whole of the citizens, cannot be placed on permanent duty, but only for a local and particular service.—In dividing the National Guard into three bands, and in composing the first of all the conscripts of the six last classes, viz. from the age of 20 to 26 years, who have not

been called upon to join the active army; the second, of men from 26 to 40 years; and the third, of men from 40 to 60 years of age: to the 1st band the active service will be confided; then the 2d and 3d bands will only have the reserve service, which is quite local.—For 1812, the 1st band, comprehending the conscripts from 1806 to 1812, who have not been called to the army, and who have not since married, and are in a condition for service, will form a resource of 600,000 men.—I propose to your Majesty to raise from this number 100 cohorts, which will constitute the fifth part of those who remain of the classes of 1806, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12. These men should be organized and clothed at the chief place of each military division.—These cohorts, composed of 8 companies, 6 of which are to be fusiliers, one artillery, and one a depot, will contain nearly one thousand men each. Your Majesty would thus have one hundred cohorts or battalions, who, constantly under arms, and united in brigades and divisions under the order of Chiefs of the Line Staff, would offer a chosen army, and might be compared to the ancient French grenadiers. These troops, constantly encamped, and by reason of their service abundantly supplied with every thing, would suffer few losses by war.—By this means our strong places on the Rhine, our establishments at the Helder, upon the Meuse, the Scheldt, at Boulogne, Cherbourg, Brest, L'Orient, Rochfort, Toulon, and Genoa, would be guarded by a combination of such force, that in five days, 30,000 men could be collected at any particular point of the coast attacked; and in less than ten days, considering the speedy means which your Majesty has established in urgent circumstances, from 60 to 80,000 men of the first band, the marine troops, the departmental guards, and of the fifth battalions; all of which would march to the point menaced, and could form a junction, independent of the assistance afforded by the 2d and 3d bands of the neighbouring departments.—I do not propose the establishment of any cavalry; the gens d'armes alone, forming a force of 16,000 chosen men, will furnish sufficient cavalry for the attacks against which we have to guard.—(*To be continued.*)